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Abstract 
 
 The Supreme Court frequently relies on state law when interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution.  What is less understood is the degree and manner in 
which the Supreme Court and other federal courts look not to state law, but 
to local law.  Although it has largely gone unnoticed, there is a robust 
practice of acknowledging and accounting for local law in the course of 
constitutional interpretation.  To take an example, one area in which the 
Supreme Court has examined local enforcement patterns is in death penalty 
jurisprudence.  In 2015, Justice Stephen Breyer, dissenting in Glossip v. 
Gross, cited to empirical data to raise an Eighth Amendment arbitrariness 
concern with geographic variation in local practice, where in a five-year 
period, “just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted 
for approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide.” In other 
rulings, judges seek to minimize constitutional interpretations that might 
disrupt local law and practice.  As is done with respect to states, judges take 
into account whether local practices are outlying or common.  Judges also 
look to local law and practice to inform the development of constitutional 
norms.  This Article analyzes and defends reliance on local law and practice 
in constitutional interpretation—not to advocate localism or deference to local 
government—but as evidence in constitutional interpretation.  Using local 
evidence in constitutional law is particularly important at a time in which 
empirical research on county-level data is providing a wealth of information 
that can better inform constitutional law. 
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LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
Introduction 
 
 The Supreme Court frequently relies on state law when interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution.1 When doing so, the Justices take look to state law for 
a range of purposes: counting the number of states adopting a type of law to 
assess “national consensus”; 2  interpretation to minimize disruption of 
existing state practice;3  enforcing the constitution against outlier states;4 
generally asking whether a constitutional rule raises federalism concerns; 
and asking whether an interpretation of the constitution comports with 
traditional notions of due process or “fundamental” rights.  Less understood 
is the degree and manner in which the Court and other federal courts look 
not just to state law, but to local law.  In this Article, I argue that local law 
and practice provides important evidence in constitutional interpretation. 
When should local evidence matter for constitutional purposes?  That 
is the subject of this Article.  Counties and cities are not sovereigns in the 
same way that states are.  For some purposes, federal courts treat local law 
as just a subset of state law.  However, just as state practices can matter 
when assessing constitutional questions, so can local practices, 
notwithstanding local governments’ lack of independent sovereignty.  Courts 
sometimes seek, for example, to interpret constitutional provisions so as to 
minimize disruption of local practices.  Courts sometimes take into account 
whether local government practices are outlying or common.  Courts 
sometimes assess local rules or practices to develop new norms.  I do not 
argue here for a version of localism—that the local deserves interpretation—I 
do argue that local government can and should matter more in constitutional 
interpretation—at a time in which empirical research on local-level data is 
providing a wealth of information that can inform the law. 5 
                                                
1 Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 
365 (2009); Note, State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal 
Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (2007).   
2 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2005). 
3 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting that “a number of states” 
had laws with exceptions for the type of peyote use at issue). 
4 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. 
L. REV.1, 6 (1996). 5	See, e.g. Brandon L. Garrett, Alexander Jakubow, and Ankur Desai, The American Death 
Penalty Decline, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY	 561 (2017) (analyzing twenty-five years of 
death sentencing data at local level and describing relevance for constitutional doctrine). I do not 
argue local practices necessarily deserve deference or constitutional rules should necessarily 
be “tailored” to accommodate local practices, but rather that local practices and rules should 
matter as important evidence in constitutional interpretation.  See also Part III, infra.  For 
prominent arguments that local constitutional norms deserve deference, see, e.g. David 
Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 
487, 561-63 (1999); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-
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One area in which the Supreme Court has prominently suggested that 
“counting counties” may be a useful exercise is in the Eighth Amendment 
context.  In 2015, Justice Stephen Breyer raised the issue directly in his 
dissent in the case of Glossip v. Gross: 
 
Geography also plays an important role in determining who is 
sentenced to death…. Between 2004 and 2009, for example, just 29 
counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for 
approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide.6 
 
Justice Breyer then discussed a growing body of empirical research 
examining the changing local geography of the death penalty and called for 
full briefing on the question whether the death penalty is now a cruel and 
unusual punishment, under the Eighth Amendment.7  Why focus on counties 
as outliers and not states?  Justice Breyer argued that focusing on local 
government shows how “unusual” the death penalty has become, and how 
arbitrary its imposition has become, citing to empirical studies examining 
local factors such as the preferences of local prosecutors, adequacy of local 
defense resources, and racial distribution within counties.8  Justice Breyer 
has repeated those concerns in a recent dissent from denial of certiorari.9 
This analysis powerfully demonstrates how local government practices 
can matter as evidence in constitutional reasoning.  In the Eighth 
Amendment context, in which the focus for many decades has been on the 
“evolving standards of decency” in our country, the Supreme Court has at 
times insisted that the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's 
legislatures.” 10   Such judicial assessment of “national consensus” and 
                                                                                                                                            
Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & Pol. 147 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the 
Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004); Mark D. Rosen, 
The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1513, 1636 (2005); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L. J. 82, 85 (2013). 	
6 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
7 Id. at 2761-62. 
8 Id. at 2762 (citing studies finding that county disparities may be due to “the power of the 
local prosecutor,” as well as “the availability of resources for defense counsel” and “the racial 
composition of and distribution within a county”). 
9 Sireci v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470 (2016) (J. Breyer, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The 
number of yearly executions has fallen from its peak of 98 in 1999 to 19 so far this year, 
while the average period of imprisonment between death sentence and execution has risen 
from 12 years to over 18 years in that same period.”) (citing Death Penalty Information 
Center (DPIC), Facts about the Death Penalty, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (updated Dec. 7, 2016); Dept. of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, T. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2013—Statistical Tables, 
p. 14 (rev. Dec. 19, 2014) (Table 10); DPIC Execution List 2016, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2016.”)). 
10 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 
(1989) (“‘[F]irst’ among the “‘objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given 
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“evolving standards of decency,” has its critics, who argue that state law is 
not the place to look;  death sentencing is linked to the preferences of local 
prosecutors, jurors, and judges. 11  In part for that reason, scholars have 
assembled a large body of empirical research examining local-level death 
sentencing practices.12  That data can inform doctrine, whether one agrees 
with Justice Breyer’s assessment of the modern death penalty or not. 
In general, relying on state law when interpreting the federal 
constitution may not always be the most appropriate way to capture the 
question whether a federal constitutional rule would unduly inhibit state 
action.  It is a far more settled practice to examine state law when 
interpreting constitutional rights than to examine local law.13   However, 
critics have long been concerned that nose-counting of state laws can be a 
strained or artificial exercise, 14  and that doing so undervalues federal 
constitutional norms, and it can conversely overvalue state government 
norms that do not fit federal constitutional values well.15  
There is not just one way in which the Supreme Court and federal 
courts rely on patterns in state law.  Perhaps most noteworthy was its 
departure from rote head-counting in Atkins v. Virginia, where the majority 
emphasized: “It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, 
but the consistency of the direction of change.”16  Sometimes a more forgiving 
minority practice is selected because it is seen as less disruptive as a 
constitutional floor than the approach adopted by the majority of states. 
Justice Harlan famously defended such rulings as “born of the need to cope 
                                                                                                                                            
sanction”’ are statutes passed by society's elected representatives.”  It is also telling that both 
of those rulings were later reversed when state legislation changed.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
11 See Lain, supra, at n.7-8 (citing critics); Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. Sarma, Sophie Cull, The 
Way the Court Gauges Consensus, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2397 (2014); Susan Raeker-Jordan, 
Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: “Still in Search of A Unifying Principle”?, 73 
U. PITT. L. REV. 107 (2011).  
12 See Garrett, Jakubow, & Desai, supra note 5; see also Brandon L. Garrett, End of its Rope: 
How Killing the Death Penalty can Revive Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017) 
(presenting statistical analysis of death sentencing from 1990 to 2015); Lee Kovarsky, Muscle 
Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE L. J. 259 (2016) 
(examining county-level concentration of death sentences). 
13 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We 
Live By 112 (Basic Books 2012); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 453 
(Oxford 2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America 4 
(Oxford 2006). 
14 For critics, see Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using 
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1091-93, 1106 (2006).  For defenses, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J. 
L & PUB. POL’Y  17 (2009); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State 
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 142-46 (2006). 
15 Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in 
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 89 (2006). 
16 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).   
LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
	 4	
with national diversity under the constraints of the incorporation doctrine.”17 
For that reason, the Court at times ratifies the practice of a minority of 
states.  In other instances, as David Strauss describes, the Court adopts a 
“modernizing” rule, to strike down infrequently enforced and outdated law.18  
While sometimes taking account of state law, in other situations, 
Supreme Court Justices have raised concerns as to competence of federal 
judges to assess state law. “The process of examining state law is 
unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we 
are generally unfamiliar,” as the majority put it in Michigan v. Long. 19  
Consistency is another reason why judges may fear considering the content of 
state law.  Deference to “the vagaries of state criminal law,” for example, can 
result in a “crazy quilt” rather than “uniform law of the land.”20  
As I will describe in Part II of this Article, there are important 
examples of robust use of local evidence in constitutional law.  I classify four 
types of use of local evidence in constitutional law, in which courts: (1) 
examine patterns of local law and practice, including in criminal procedure 
cases, and most prominently in the death penalty area; (2) examine best 
practices at the local level to influence the appropriate constitutional floor, 
including in the Fourth Amendment area; (3) examine county-level 
enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely enforced 
at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional 
norm-development, including in the Fourteenth Amendment cases.  In Part 
II, I explore examples of each. 
Indeed, I will argue that the concern with judicial ability to assess local 
practices has been honored largely in the breach. To provide one high profile 
example, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore, heavily emphasized the 
inconsistencies in practices for conducting the Presidential vote recount from 
county to county, and also among recount teams within single counties.21  
The ruling has been strongly criticized and its precedential value is unclear 
from the text of the ruling itself.22  However, the concern with arbitrary and 
discriminatory practice and patterns is far from unique to the election law 
                                                
17 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 136 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
18 David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 
878-79 (2009). 
19 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983). 
20 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
21 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106. 
22 Markenzy Lapointe, Bush v. Gore: Equal Protection Turned on its Head, Perhaps for a 
Good Though Unintended Reason, 2 WYO. L. REV. 435, 479 (2002); David Cole, The Liberal 
Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1427, 1452-74 (2006).  The Court stated that its 
ruling was “limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in 
election processes generally presents many complexities.  531 U.S. at 109.  See also see 
generally Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite this Case!: The Precedential Value of Bush v. 
Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141 (2006). 
LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
	 5	
context. 23   Indeed, looking at law and practices at the local level may 
sometimes answer objections to relying on state-level law or practice.  States 
may not be the most accurate signals of state legal practice in situations 
when decisionmaking is more focused at the local level.24  
In Part III, I turn to the methodological issues raised by using local 
evidence in constitutional interpretation.  The decision whether to defer to 
local practices or not should itself be evidence-based.  For example, the 
frequent lack of good data about county practices can be a real obstacle to 
using such evidence to inform constitutional interpretation.  Judicial reliance 
on local law and practice should not be, and sometimes has been, quite 
anecdotal and ill-informed. This Article describes burgeoning research 
examining county-level data and assesses the state of that research and the 
areas in which further data is needed.  Ultimately, in this Article, I set out an 
empirical research and a constitutional law agenda for better use of local 
evidence in constitutional interpretation.  
 
 
 
I.  DISAGGREGATING THE STATES  
 
Examination of state law is pervasive in constitutional law, despite 
concerns raised concerning the competence of federal judges to assess state 
law and the relevance of state law to federal constitutional interpretation 
questions.  Many of the most significant Supreme Court rulings interpreting 
the U.S. Constitution do so while citing evidence from state law.  Often the 
Justices include in their analysis some discussion of the numbers of states 
adopting law consistent or inconsistent with the advanced constitutional 
interpretation.  Some of the reasons for examining state law have to do with 
the states as sovereigns, and therefore the reasoning would not support 
similarly examining the content of local law.  However, when one examines 
that analysis more closely, many of the reasons for focusing solely on state-
level lawmaking are not sovereignty-related, and as sovereignty-based  
reasons start to erode, the case for a sharp distinction between the 
treatments of state and local practices weakens. This Part begins with an 
overview of the uses of state law in constitutional interpretation and then it 
turns to the normative rationales for that usage, before turning to the sources 
for law at the local level. 
 
                                                
23 For a Note arguing that Bush v. Gore should inform analysis of the constitutionality of the 
death penalty, see Andrew Ditchfield, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the 
Application of Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801 (2007). 
24 There is another advantage of relying on local government that I develop in Part III: 
unlike state governments which have sovereign immunity and cannot be sued for damages 
for violating the constitutional rights of individuals, local governments are liable, and could 
therefore be more accountable and likely to adhere to constitutional norms. 
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A. Uses of State Law in Constitutional Interpretation 
 
The Supreme Court has looked to state law in a number of different 
ways and using a range of different methods.  There are a series of important 
questions to ask about when and whether state law should be used, and none 
of these questions have answers that are consistent across areas of Supreme 
Court doctrine.  These questions include: 
 
What type of consensus matters?   
 
State law may or may not be a useful measure depending on what type 
of consensus matters for constitutional purposes.  The Eighth Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has long held, “must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 25  
Whether state law is a good or bad marker for the standards of decency in 
society is a difficult question.  
  
When is current state law relevant and when is old state law relevant?  
 
In Glucksberg v. Washington, the Court noted how few states 
permitted assisted suicide in finding the asserted due process right as not 
“fundamental.” 26   A “fundamental” right might demand quite a bit of 
consensus, and perhaps over a long period of time, to obtain that status.  In 
other areas, the Court is more concerned with current practice and whether a 
new constitutional interpretation or rule might disrupt it.  In Fourth 
Amendment cases, the Court may assess reasonableness of searches by 
examining state legislation, regarding subjects as diverse as warrantless 
arrests and state rules of evidence.27  In Sixth Amendment cases, the Court 
has cited to state practices regarding size of juries, or whether factfinding is 
by a judge or a jury.28  In its Sixth Amendment ruling on state statutes 
permitting judicial imposition of the death penalty, in Ring v. Arizona, the 
Court noted how “the great majority of States responded to this Court's 
Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating 
circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the 
jury.”29 
 
What if the law in the states is in flux?  
 
                                                
25 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
26 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
27 E.g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961). 
28 Ring v. Arizina, 536 U.S. 584, 607-8 (2002); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98 (1970). 
29 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607-08 (2002). 
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To take a prominent example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme 
Court noted that about half the states at that time criminalized homosexual 
sodomy.30  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled Bowers and found that 
the Bowers court had wholly “overstated” the prior practice, by focusing on 
which states had laws on the book, and not at how often such laws were 
actually enforced.31  In the Eighth Amendment area, in which the Court is 
focused on contemporary standards of decency, in recent cases, the Court has 
examined not just a count of how many states have statutes on the books, but 
the “direction” of movement among state legislatures to or from some type of 
statute.  The Court has also focused on subsets of states as relevant when 
considering the degree of state law adoption of a type of measure.  For 
example, the Court has noted that there would be little need for states in 
which, for example, no executions have been carried out in decades, to 
reconsider their death penalty statutes, and therefore such statutes might 
not “count” when taking the measure of the law in the states.32 
 
What evidence should be cited of the existence or usage of state law?   
 
In the substantive due process context and in equal protection cases, 
the Supreme Court has similarly focused on how many states have statutes 
on the books, but sometimes the Court does more than “nosecount.”  The 
Justices sometimes also ask, as noted, whether those statutes are enforced, 
and what are the numbers of sentences actually imposed under those 
statutes (if they are criminal statutes). 33   The Justices have also asked 
whether to count a state with a statute on the books, but which has been 
found unconstitutional by the state supreme court.34  Timing can also matter. 
The Justices have asked how recently adopted state statutes were, perhaps 
treating statutes that have lingered on the books for a long time as a relic of 
an earlier era, but more recent adoption as a sign that a type of statute 
retains popularity. 
 
What level of state law adoption matters?   
 
The underlying constitutional right at issue may demand more or less 
strength of state evidence.  In the Eighth Amendment cases concerning the 
                                                
30 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986). 
31 539 U.S. at 571. 
32 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 
(1967); Enmund v. Virginia, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982) (noting that there were only three 
individuals on death row in the U.S. in the relevant category of non-direct participant felony 
murderers). 
34 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423-25 (not counting Florida where although the state death 
penalty statute includes child rape as death eligible, “where the Supreme Court of Florida 
held the death penalty for child sexual assault to be unconstitutional.”) 
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death penalty, for example, the Supreme Court refers to “national consensus” 
as the standard.  That standard can call for very strong evidence of state law 
and practice.  However, the Justices have disputed whether that consists in a 
majority of the states, or a majority of the relevant death penalty states, or 
something far more demanding than that.  For example, in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, the Court emphasized: “44 States have not made child rape a 
capital offense.”35  Yet that was an overstatement in the sense that many of 
those were not states that any longer retained the death penalty for any 
criminal offenses.  In Graham v. Florida, the Court identified thirteen states 
banned life without parole for at least some juvenile offenses, but the Court 
found that the practice nevertheless violated the Eighth Amendment. 36  
Strict nose-counting clearly is not the only explanation of those outcomes. 
 
As the Sections that follow will discuss, these same questions are 
important when the courts look to local practices when interpreting the 
Constitution.  However, these questions have not been asked or answered as 
openly or with as much attention to methodological concerns. 
 
B.  Norms and Nose-counting  
 
What are the purposes of assessing state law during constitutional 
interpretation?  In some areas, such as the Eighth Amendment cases 
concerning whether punishment is cruel and unusual, the doctrine itself asks 
about the existence of “national consensus” on an issue, and it therefore calls 
for some assessment of state law.37  In Glucksberg, the Court asked how 
many states permitted assisted suicide when asking whether a candidate for 
substantive due process protection was a “fundamental” right.38  State law 
was evidence of how lawmakers treated the right.    
In other areas, though, the doctrine does not as clearly call for such an 
assessment, and the courts find it valuable for other reasons.  One reason 
courts may look to state law is to assess not whether state law already 
recognizes a right and therefore federal law should follow, but to assess what 
degree of disruption would result if a new federal right or interpretation of 
the constitution is adopted.  In other contexts, judges may defer to state 
practices because they believe that state judges or lawmakers may have more 
expertise in an area and may be more likely to have the correct answers.  
Justice Sotomayor in Kansas v. Carr emphasized this function of federalism-
based deference in a ruling regarding a Kansas procedure in death penalty 
                                                
35 554 U.S. at 423. 
36 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010). 
37 554 U.S. at 423. 
38 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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trials. 39   Justice Sotomayor explained: “[The role of state courts as 
innovators] is particularly important in the criminal arena because state 
courts preside over many millions more criminal cases than their federal 
counterparts and so are more likely to identify protections important to a fair 
trial.”40 Similarly, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have argued that broadly 
held interpretations or views may not only deserve deference, but they may 
be more likely to be correct. 41   The states may be laboratories for 
experimentation that over time reach sound or even correct answers. 
One might assume that a useful component of federalism would 
involve some deference to state lawmaking, including by asking whether 
some type of state law is a common one, for which a constitutional challenge 
might disrupt accepted state practice.  However, even from the perspective of 
federalism, some have criticized the use of information about state law in 
constitutional interpretation.  One source of criticism relates to what was 
discussed above: that it is hard to decide in any objective fashion what counts 
as sufficient consensus among the states.42  Others more broadly argue that 
state constitutionalism should be robust and is an important source for 
informed law.43  These debates, even if they have not been resolved and 
involve deeper questions about the role of evidence and federalism in 
constitutional interpretation, are far more developed than debates about the 
role of evidence and localism in constitutional interpretation. 
 
C.  Counting Localities 
 
There are more than 39,000 localities in the United States, with over 
19,000 municipal governments, over 16,500 townships, and over 3,000 
counties, according to the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data.44  When 
referring broadly to localities or counties in this Article, I include other types 
of local administrative units, particularly incorporated municipalities or 
                                                
39 Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 647–48 (2016) (“We intervene in an intrastate dispute 
between the State's executive and its judiciary rather than entrusting the State's structure of 
government to sort it out... And we lose valuable data about the best methods of protecting 
constitutional rights—a particular concern in cases like these, where the federal 
constitutional question turns on the ‘reasonable likelihood’ of jury confusion, an empirical 
question best answered with evidence from many state courts.”). 
40 Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 648. 
41 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 142-46 
(2006). 
42 Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation 
as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1091-93, 1106 (2006).  
43 For a defense see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J. L & PUB. POL’Y  17 
(2009).  For a broader argument in favor of robust state constitutionalism, see Paul W. Kahn, 
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993). 
44 National League of Cities, Number of Municipal Governments and Population Distribution 
(last visited January 11, 2018), at http://www.nlc.org/number-of-municipal-governments-
population-distribution. 
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cities, as well as parishes, districts, and other types of units.  One criticism of 
a legal focus on federal law and particularly constitutional law is that it 
ignores how central local government units are to the day-to-day lives of 
residents.45  Local government can inform state law and state constitutional 
law, although to varying degrees depending on the structure of lawmaking in 
any given state and the practical reality of state politics.46   
That said, local government does not have the same sovereign status 
as state government.  As the Supreme Court has often stated: “States 
traditionally have been accorded the widest latitude in ordering their 
internal governmental processes.”47  Local government entities are “political 
subdivisions such as cities and counties are created by the State,” and they 
exist “as convenient agencies for exercising such of the government powers as 
may be entrusted to them.”48  Constitutional provisions do limit the power 
and authority of the state over local entities.  For example, equal protection 
and voting rights may not be infringed upon.  However, the background 
presumption is that local entities are creatures of state law.  For that reason, 
the Court has often emphasized state law sources as more authoritative and 
permanent. The Supreme Court has also sometimes suggested that local 
government is less to be trusted in matters of constitutional interpretation.  
As the Court put it, “small and local authority may feel less sense of 
responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of publicity may be less 
vigilant in calling it to account.”49  If so, as I develop, looking at whether local 
practices are atypical should matter in the analysis, and similarly, that local 
practices are common and representative should matter in the analysis.  The 
decision whether to defer to local practices or not should be evidence-based. 
 
 D.  Localism without Evidence 
 
Despite the contingent status of local government entities, in a series 
of cases, Supreme Court Justices have emphasized the importance of local 
autonomy in constitutional interpretation.  There is a large literature on 
localism and the degree to which the Court emphasizes it, and localism is not 
my subject in this Article.  What is important to note, however, is that 
typically in opinions that do describe a need to defer to local government 
decisions, the Court does not solicit or attempt to measure the views of local 
                                                
45 See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to 
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & PUB. POL’Y Rev.187, 218 (1996) (“the 
Court’s decisions have recognized the key role of localities without explicitly saying so.”) 
46 Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627 (2001). 
47 Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 475 (1982). 
48 Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 
178 (1907). 
49 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943). 
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government, necessarily, but nevertheless interprets the constitution to defer 
to local interests.50   
Such rulings, deferring to the local in a largely uncritical fashion, are 
exactly what I would argue that the Supreme Court and federal courts should 
not be doing. When turning from the national to the local, sometimes the 
Court has emphasized that a diversity of local practices is unproblematic or 
should be embraced.  For example, the Supreme Court ruled in Missouri v. 
Lewis that “[i]f diversities of laws . . . may exist in the several States without 
violating the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid 
reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of the same 
State.”51  The Court has approved funding laws that provide very different 
resource levels to public schools, based on county districting.52  Instead, I 
would argue, the Court should conduct a careful examination of that 
variation in resource levels and assess whether it is non-arbitrary or not.  
In other areas, the Supreme Court has avoided discussing the local 
government implications or bases for its rulings, and such rulings also raise 
the concern that local evidence is not even being considered.  Scholars have 
argued that the Court discusses the local when it is convenient and ignores 
the local when it is not convenient; Joan Williams has called this a type of 
“forum-shifting,” not by litigants, but by “shifting power among different 
levels of government.”53 Professor Richard Schragger has argued that local 
government is an important but neglected constitutional actor in the 
Establishment Clause context where “much of Religion Clause doctrine has 
been forged in conflicts that directly implicate the traditional powers of local 
government.”54  Schragger criticizes the Supreme Court for not distinguishing 
between national and local regulation of religion, and that doing so can invite 
more damaging centralized regulation, as opposed to local municipal power.55   
                                                
50 Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The 
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 84 (1986) (“Given that the 
fourteenth amendment allows courts to limit state sovereignty in order to vindicate federal 
constitutional rights, why should the sovereignty of localities, which are mere subdivisions of 
states, limit the reach of the fourteenth amendment when states' sovereignty cannot?”). 
51 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).  See also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1887).  See also 
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (“While such regulations are subject to 
judicial scrutiny upon fundamental grounds, yet a considerable latitude of discretion must be 
accorded to the lawmaking power; and so long as the regulation in question is not shown to 
be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly 
situated in the particular district, the district itself not appearing to have been arbitrarily 
selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a deprivation of property without due 
process of law, or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the 14th 
Amendment.”). 
52 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973). 53	Williams, supra note 49, at 87-88.	
54 Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious 
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004). 
55 Id. at 1818. 
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The local preferences of counties and cities do seem to matter more, 
and receive more explicit acknowledgment by the Supreme Court, in areas 
that are seen as traditionally subject to such local regulation.  Justice 
William J. Brennan famously asked in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of 
San Diego, “‘If a policeman must know the Constitution, why not a 
planner?”56  The Supreme Court’s rulings regarding zoning decisions and 
land use matters adopted a highly deferential standard, making it 
unnecessary to engage much with the content of local law; the idea was to 
defer to local preferences.57  
Then again, the Court’s direction is not fully consistent in the land use 
and takings area either.  More recent rulings have adopted less deferential 
standards in rulings concerning the Takings Clause and so-called regulatory 
takings in which local land use regulations affect property.58  Such rulings 
may reflect an abiding concern with localism: that the local does not deserve 
deference if localities are abusing the rights of individuals or of groups.  In 
dissent in the 2013 ruling in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District, Justice Elena Kagan expressed the concern that the Court by 
relaxing its traditional deference “threaten[] to subject a vast array of land-
use regulations, applied daily in States and localities throughout the country, 
to heightened constitutional scrutiny.”59   
My focus is not on when localism should matter, but that the question 
whether and how to defer to the local should be, in my view, informed by 
empirical evidence.  As described in this part, there is a literature and a 
practice of relying on state evidence when considering the role of federalism 
in constitutional interpretation.  The relevance of evidence in considering the 
role of localism raises different questions.  If deference risks constitutional 
rights violations in the view of the majority, then it is understandable that 
such deference would be restrained, but more must be known about the 
variation and content and the effects of local government policies.  In the next 
Part, I turn to a series of concrete examples in which local evidence is 
considered in constitutional law, at varying levels of sophistication and for 
several different purposes. 
 
II.  EXAMPLES OF LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
The use of local evidence in constitutional law is in fact a robust part of 
constitutional practice, if not theory.  In this Part, I turn to areas in which 
constitutional law is to some degree already informed by local law and 
                                                
56 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
57 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
58 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 
U.S. 374, 391 (1994).  
59 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, J. 
dissenting).  
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practice.  Sometimes local sources inform the courts.  At other times, to be 
sure, they do not.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes expressed 
skepticism at the value of examining local practices at all.  The result of that 
analysis can suggest a “crazy quilt” of local practices that are not suited to 
inform the “uniform law of the land.”60  Nevertheless, before deciding what 
the uniform rule should be, even if it is just a constitutional floor, it is 
important, I argue, to understand what the local practices are, whether they 
are uniform or a “crazy quilt,” and what that means for the rule one might 
adopt at the federal level.   
In this Part, I make the case that looking to local government is not 
only possible and sometimes done, but it can significantly advance 
constitutional analysis and interpretation.  It can make constitutional law 
better.  In Part III, I will then turn towards a more principled and 
empirically informed approach towards relying on local government evidence, 
which is so lacking in the Supreme Court’s largely inconsistent approach 
towards the problem. 
In this Part, I classify four types of use of local evidence in 
constitutional law, in which courts: (1) examine patterns of local law and 
practice, most prominently in the death penalty area; (2) examine best 
practices at the local level to influence the appropriate constitutional floor, 
including in the Fourth Amendment area; (3) examine county-level 
enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely enforced 
at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional 
norm-development, including in the Fourteenth Amendment cases. 
Before turning to examples of each of those four types, I note as a 
preliminary matter that local governments cannot invoke the U.S. 
Constitution as against states under the rule of Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh.61  That rule ensures local government actors are not, directly, 
constitutional actors as against states.  However, local government actors are 
nevertheless crucial constitutional litigants. Local government can be sued 
and held civilly accountable for federal constitutional violations by its 
officials, without the benefit of state sovereign immunity, under the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine in Monell v. Department of Social Services.62  As a result of 
                                                
60 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 
163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
61 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).  For an insightful critical analysis of the doctrine, see Kathleen 
S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 
(2012); see also David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the 
Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2232 (2006); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 
57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush 
v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 393, 395-96, 407- 
09 (2002).  See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (“Legislative control 
of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations 
imposed by the United States Constitution.”) 
62 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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that doctrine interpreting the central civil rights statute, cities and counties 
are common defendants in constitutional litigation.  A range of constitutional 
doctrines developed by taking interests of local government into account 
because local government is the litigant.  Several such doctrines are 
developed in this Part.  
Local evidence can also inform constitutional law; that is the subject of 
this Part. Should local laws, policies, or legal practices matter when 
conducting constitutional interpretation? There are any number of 
constitutional rulings that happen to involve challenges to municipal 
ordinances or local government actors that do not dwell on the subject. If 
local government should matter, how should it matter?  After all, some 
answers to the questions posed about the use of state law in constitutional 
cases would come out differently if the court was focused instead upon 
counties as the relevant unit of inquiry.  For some questions, state law may 
seem distant from the locus of local decisionmaking.  Counties may be 
particularly important areas for focus in matters in which law and 
policymaking is itself focused at the local level.  For example, criminal law, 
land use, and even areas often seen as federal, like immigration enforcement, 
are all heavily impacted by local level decisions.63  As I will describe in this 
Part, a careful analysis of local practices can improve decisionmaking and 
add valuable information to constitutional interpretation and analysis. 
 
A.  Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
 
In general, criminal justice is highly localized in the United States: it 
is a fragmented system.  Although state law defines criminal offenses and 
sentences, with states running prisons, 64  the larger work of arresting 
offenders, charging them, convicting them, and supervising them post-
conviction, falls to counties.  The trial courts, prosecutor’s offices, police 
agencies, defense offices, are all usually governed almost entirely locally.  
County priorities and policies matter enormously, as to style of policing, 
charging decisions by prosecutors, resources for defense lawyers, and 
approaches adopted by judges.  For those reasons, constitutional criminal 
procedure is a particularly ripe area for careful consideration of the local in 
                                                
63 On immigration enforcement and wide variation in local practice as between different 
large urban counties, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of 
Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126 (2013) (“American criminal justice 
plays out at the local level. At the same time, federal immigration enforcement increasingly 
takes place in partnership with local police, prosecutors, jailers, and probation officers. The 
consequences of this new dynamic are surprisingly understudied.”); see also David Alan 
Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 
202 (2012). 
64 For a critique of this tendency, see W. David Ball, Why State Prisons? 33 YALE L. POL’Y 
REV. 75 (2014). 
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interpretation.  As the sections that follow will describe, several areas are 
important examples of use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation. 
 
1.  Local Enforcement Patterns and the Eighth Amendment 
 
The death penalty is an area subject to a complex body of 
constitutional regulation under the Eighth Amendment, in particular.  One 
reason why the death penalty is an area that can particularly benefit from 
local constitutional interpretation is that in its decades-long modern 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has increasingly looked not just to state-
level practices but also local practices.  These cases provide an example of the 
first type of use of local evidence that I set out in this Part: examining 
patterns of local law and practice in criminal procedure cases.  
In the past, as noted, the Supreme Court looked to states and not 
localities.  The Justices had highlighted for Eighth Amendment purposes how 
“first among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a 
given sanction are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.”65  
Rulings therefore asked how many states adopted death penalty statutes of a 
given type to assess what contemporary attitudes are towards them.  The 
Supreme Court’s concern that the death penalty may be imposed arbitrarily 
in a manner that “smacks of little more than a lottery system”66 or that is “so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed”67 dates back to its ruling in Furman v. 
Georgia, finding the death penalty unconstitutional in 1972, only to reverse 
course in Gregg v. Georgia and companion cases in 1976, having been assured 
that new more detailed state-level statutes would make death sentences more 
predictable and informed. 68  Focusing on state death penalty statutes, 
Supreme Court had not often cited to county-level death sentencing practices 
in its Eighth Amendment cases.   
However, this largely state-level focus has changed over time.  The 
Court has increasingly cited to the practices of sentencing juries and charging 
practices by prosecutors as relevant in addition to state-level statutes.  Thus, 
dissenting in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Antonin Scalia noted:  “[W]e have, in 
our determination of society's moral standards, consulted the practices of 
sentencing juries: Juries maintain a link between contemporary community 
values and the penal system that this Court cannot claim for itself.”69  The 
concern with the practical reality of jury decisionmaking dates back to the 
Furman v. Georgia ruling itself. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his opinion, 
                                                
65 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
66 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring). 
67 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring). 
68 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (stating that “the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty 
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and 
guidance.”). 
69 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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emphasized that state statutes are not a sufficient guide to current death 
penalty practices: “Legislative ‘policy’ is thus necessarily defined not by what 
is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the 
discretion so regularly conferred upon them.”70 In other rulings, the Justices 
have more strongly emphasized presence or absence of state statutes as the 
best evidence for current death penalty practices.   
The Eighth Amendment relevance of counties is changing, as the 
increasingly fine-grained data about death sentencing practices makes its 
way into the courts.  As noted in the Introduction, in a dissent in 2015, 
Justice Breyer raised the issue directly in Glossip v. Gross, writing: 
 
Geography also plays an important role in determining who is 
sentenced to death…. Between 2004 and 2009, for example, just 29 
counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for 
approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide. 
 
Justice Breyer added that where, “The Eighth Amendment forbids 
punishments that are cruel and unusual. Perhaps more importantly, in the 
last two decades, the imposition and implementation of the death penalty 
have increasingly become unusual.”  Justice Breyer called for full briefing on 
the question whether the death penalty is now cruel and unusual, under the 
Eighth Amendment, and when that briefing occurs, “data-driven 
arbitrariness review” may take on a more prominent role, with the 
availability of detailed county-level data on death sentencing.71 
Not only is the doctrine amenable to local-level analysis, but there is a 
growing body of empirical data available to inform the doctrine.  In recent 
years, just a few dozen counties have accounted for the bulk of death 
sentences imposed nationwide.  Scholars have conducted detailed research 
collecting data on the use of the death penalty at the county level; the data 
was not available before they began to do so, as the federal government only 
reports state-level data on death sentencing.  The first study to do so 
comprehensively, the landmark “Broken System” study led by Professor 
James Liebman, Valerie West, and Jeffrey Fagan examined death sentences 
from 1977 through 1995, and found a concentration of death sentences in a 
small minority of counties. 72  The researchers noted, “Even in Texas, nearly 
60% of its counties did not impose a single death sentence in the period.”73  A 
                                                
70 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
71 Smith, supra note xxx, at 254.  Professor Smith also called for collection more detailed 
charging data regarding potentially capital cases in order to better examine what factors 
influenced county-level processing and outcomes in death-eligible cases.  Id. at 256. 
72 James Liebman & P. Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty 
Today, 9 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 255, 312 (2012). 
73 Id. at 264.  Further, data analysis of appellate and post-conviction reversals showed that 
state courts were more likely to overturn death sentences from urban than rural and small-
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more recent report analyzing executions in 1976, including from data 
collected by Professor Frank Baumgartner, found that only 2% of counties in 
the U.S. were responsible for a majority of the cases, and 85% of the counties 
in the U.S. had not had a single execution in over 45 years.74  
A study by Professor Robert J. Smith of recent death sentences 
between 2004 and 2009 found even greater concentration, as death sentences 
have declined in number, noting that: “The geographic distribution of death 
sentences reveals a clustering around a narrow band of counties: roughly 1% 
of counties in the United States returned death sentences at a rate of one or 
more sentences per year from 2004 to 2009.”75  Thus, Smith noted, Los 
Angeles County, California sentenced more people to death in 2009 as the 
entire state of Texas, and Maricopa County, Arizona sentenced more than the 
entire state of Alabama.76  Crossing county lines can make a huge difference; 
for example, the chances of being sentenced to death in Baltimore County 
were 13 times higher than in Baltimore City, when Maryland had the death 
penalty.77  In Texas, Harris County accounts for the vast bulk of the states 
death row, far out of proportion to its population or to the numbers of 
murders occurring in the County.78  A “small set of counties” are imposing 
death sentences, and this means that “it is the practices, policies, habits and 
political milieu of local prosecutors, jurors and judges that dictate whether a 
given defendant in the United States—whatever his crime—will be charged, 
tried, convicted and sentenced capitally and executed.” 79   What explains 
which counties are the most prone to impose death sentences?   
Brandon Garrett, Alexander Jakubow and Ankur Desai recently 
conducted research analyzing the entire period of modern death sentencing, 
collecting data at the county-level on death sentencing from 1990 through 
present.  That data is described in an empirical article and in a recent book, 
titled, “End of its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Crimnal 
Justice.”80  The researchers describe a dramatic decline in death sentencing, 
                                                                                                                                            
town jurisdictions.  Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Pattern of 
Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 209, 247 (2004). 
74 Frank R. Baumgartner, The North Carolina Database of U.S. Executions, U. N.C. Chapel 
Hill, Departmentt Pol. Sci., available at http://www.unc.edu/~ 
fbaum/Innocence/executions.htm; Richard C. Dieter, The 2% Death Penalty: How a Minority 
of Counties Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All, Death Penalty Information 
Center (October 2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf. 
75 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. 
Rev. 227, 228 (2012). 
76 Id. at 233. 
77  Raymond Paternoster et al., An Empirical Analysis Of Maryland’s Death Sentencing 
System With Respect To The Influence Of Race And Legal Jurisdiction 30-31 (2003). 
78 Dieter, supra, at 13-14. 
79 Liebman, supra note xxx at 262 (reporting “from 1973 to 1995, sixty-six counties imposed 
2569 of the 5131 total death sentences.”). 80	Garrett, Jakubow, Desai, supra note xxx, at	561; Brandon L. Garrett, End of its Rope: How 
Killing the Death Penalty can Revive Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017).	
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where only thirty-nine people were sentenced to death in 2017 and only 
thirty-one in 2016, record lows, as compared with over 300 sentenced to death 
in the 1990s.  Only twenty-eight counties sentenced people to death in 2016, 
as compared with over two hundred counties per year in the 1990s.  The 
figure below displays the number of counties that imposed death sentences 
from 1990 through 2016.81 
 
Fig. 1.  Number of Counties with Death Sentences, 1990-2016 
 
 
In this empirical work, Garrett, Jakubow, and Desai describe how 
death sentencing has almost entirely disappeared in rural America over the 
space of fifteen years.  In the past decade, death sentencing has become a 
fixture in only a scattered group of larger, more populous and urban 
counties.82   The figure below illustrations the growing population density 
among the shrinking group of counties that impose death sentences.  The 
counties are also increasingly racially fragmented and have relatively larger 
black populations. 
 
Fig. 2. Demographic Trends by Sentencing Status83 
                                                81	Garrett, Jakubow & Desai, supra, at 125.	82	Garrett, Jakubow & Desai, supra, at Part II.A.	
83 Id. at 131.	
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Death sentencing occurs in counties with higher murder rates, but it is 
counties with more white victims of murder that engage in more death 
sentencing, while black homicide victimization is not correlated with death 
sentencing. 84    Finally, counties that impose death sentences exhibit a 
powerful inertia effect, where death sentencing is strongly associated with 
prior county-level death sentencing.85    
These results have implications for constitutional regulation of the 
death penalty.  They also raise the question whether the death penalty has 
become arbitrary under the Eighth Amendment.86 To date, such arguments 
have largely not been considered in the courts.  To be sure, the Supreme 
Court has considered and rejected empirical evidence concerning death 
sentencing patterns before, and this raises the concern that even now that 
more research has been done, that country-level patterns may not matter to 
the Justices in the future.  In its ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme 
Court considered a state-specific study of Georgia death sentencing 
patterns.87  The data showed a strong correlation between the race of the 
victim and the likelihood that a defendant would be sentenced to death.  The 
Justices emphasized that this data was focused at the state level, and not the 
county or the case in which the defendant had been sentenced.   
In fact, in McCleskey, county-level data displayed the same race 
disparity.  The particular county, Fulton County, Georgia, in which Warren 
McKleskey was prosecuted, had 32 death-eligible prosecutions, and a 
defendant killing a white victim was 3.6 times more likely to get the death 
penalty than if the victim was black.88 The Justices, however were more 
broadly skeptical of such empirical data, particularly where there is so much 
discretion build into a range of decisionmakers, such as the prosecutor, the 
judge, and the jurors, who make decisions whether to bring cases and 
ultimately what sentence to impose.  The Justices’ reasoning rejected the 
relevance of empirics, and only modestly engaged with the reality of local 
practice and dynamics when making sentencing decisions. 
Does local evidence when used in constitutional interpretation more 
faithfully apply the command of the Eighth Amendment?  Perhaps the 
modern empirical case provides a more powerful demonstration of 
arbitrariness in death sentencing, based on county-level data and a steep 
decline in the use of the death penalty.  County lines are highly salient if not 
completely determinative in practice.  Should they matter under the 
Constitution? This is not an argument based on localism, or a notion that 
                                                84	Id., supra, at Part II.C.	85	Id., supra, at Part II.E.	86	Id. at Part III.D.	
87 Such data was most prominently the subject of the Supreme Court’s ruling in McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987). 
88 Baldus et al, 232, in Death Penalty Stories. 
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localities deserve deference.  Indeed, these data show that outlier localities do 
not deserve deference because their practices are grossly out of line with that 
of other localities, even in leading death sentencing states.  These disparities 
raise a constitutional concern under the Eighth Amendment that the 
imposition of the death penalty has become far more “unusual” and arbitrary 
than in the past.  That outlier concern places the approach in the third 
category of use of local evidence, where the patterns in local enforcement may 
show that the state law is itself an outlier that is rarely used.  This concern is 
all the more severe when one looks at how few counties even within the most 
seemingly staunch death penalty states that currently impose death 
sentences.  Whether Justices other than Justice Breyer will want to address 
these concerns in future years is an open question.   
 
 2.  Local Norm Development and the Fourth Amendment 
 
 The Fourth Amendment doctrine regulating the use of force by police, 
including deadly force, is another area in which local constitutional 
interpretation is ripe for reconsideration.  This area is one in which courts 
have sometimes, but not often, used the second category that I describe in 
this Part: courts have examined best practices at the local level to influence 
the appropriate constitutional floor.  In deciding whether to recognize a due 
process right, in criminal procedure cases, the Court typically does not 
conduct a cost benefit analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, but rather asks 
whether it is a fundamental right that has been traditionally protected by 
states.  Sometimes, however, the Court also looks at local government rules, 
not to assess their usage empirically, but rather to survey what is accepted 
local practice.  The Fourth Amendment is a surprising example, but the way 
in which the Court has looked at local government practices has changed over 
time in a way that provides a troubling object lesson. 
One prominent example of local constitutional interpretation is 
Tennessee v. Garner, a seminal case regarding the use of deadly force by 
police officers under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  The Supreme Court noted that: “In evaluating the 
reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment, we have 
also looked to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions.”89 The case itself 
involved a police officer shooting a non-dangerous fleeing felon, as permitted 
under a state statute and the traditional common law rule.  But the Court 
carefully examined police department policies and did not simply rely on 
state statutes.  The Court noted that “[a majority of police departments in 
this country have forbidden the use of deadly force against nonviolence 
suspects.”90  The Court mentioned examples of police policies, including the 
New York City Police Department and those of forty-four other law 
                                                
89 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
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enforcement agencies.  The Court also cited research on best practices by 
police organizations such as International Association of Chiefs of Police and 
the accreditation criteria of the Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies.91  Thus, the Court used local practices to inform best 
practices in the Fourth Amendment area, that themselves informed the 
constitutional rule adopted.  
The ruling in Garner was something of a high-water mark, though, in 
the attention that the Supreme Court paid to local police practices.  In the 
decades since, the Justices have instead emphasized discretion of individual 
officers, rather than police department-level practices and supervision.  In 
doing so, the Justices have disregarded evidence that a particular police 
department’s policy or practices are outlier practices that are dangerous, 
unwise, or unusual among professional police departments.   
For example, in its ruling in Scott v. Harris, the Justices reviewed the 
decision by an officer to end a high speed chase by running a vehicle off the 
road, which resulted in severe injuries to the driver.92  The Justices did not 
discuss best practices in any way, and suggested that what is right may 
depend on what is reasonable in the circumstances. 93  The Justices never 
engaged with, much less discussed, policing literature on the dangers of 
permitting high speed chases at all, much less using ramming techniques to 
end them in a potentially highly dangerous fashion.  Only Justice Stevens in 
dissent discussed alternative means for ending high speed chases.94   
Had the Justices engaged with local practices, the opinion in Scott v. 
Harris would have looked very different.  The International Association of the 
Chiefs of Police policy stated that: “Officers may not intentionally use their 
vehicle to bump or ram the suspect’s vehicle in order to force the vehicle to a 
stop off the road or in a ditch.”95  Moreover, as Seth Stoughton and I have 
discussed, the record was replete with evidence of poor local policy, 
supervision and training.96  Many other recent Supreme Court rulings on 
police use of force have done the same.  The Justices’ ruling in Sheehan, like 
that in Harris, entirely failed to engage with what well-trained officers 
should do, and what the practices are in professional agencies, for engaging 
with mentally ill individuals.97   
There are many structural features of modern civil rights litigation 
that draw attention away from questions of sound local government policy 
and practice, than the manner in which the Justices interpret rights.  
Litigation often focuses on the conduct of individual officers and not on local 
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government-level policy, supervision, and training.98  However, as cases like 
Garner show, there is room in the doctrine to focus on what sound local police 
practices are, and to use sound police practices to inform the constitutional 
doctrine.  The constitutional rule may be a floor, but it need not undermine 
local government efforts run professional police departments. 
 
B.  Local Outliers and Substantive Due Process  
 
 In rulings concerning substantive due process rights regarding 
marriage, procreation, family relationships, education, sexual orientation, 
and other privacy and autonomy-related rights, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes looked not just to state law but local practices and enforcement, to 
get a broad sense whether a type of practice is an outlier practice.  In that 
context, the Court has typically not relied on detailed information concerning 
local practices.  However, local government practices have still played an 
important role in the development of the doctrine.  These cases provide an 
example of the third category that I develop in this Part: courts examining 
county-level enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is 
rarely enforced at the local level. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld state anti-sodomy laws and 
noted, using state head-counting that about half the states had criminalized 
sodomy.99  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled Bowers, and found that 
the Bowers court at “overstated” the prior practice, including by focusing on 
state law and because since that ruling, states had moved away from 
prohibiting same-sex conduct.100  The Court emphasized how rarely any of 
those laws on the books were used; even at the time of Bowers, states like 
Georgia “had not sought to enforce its law for decades.”101   
What Justice Kennedy could have highlighted was that it was local 
prosecutors who were declining to bring cases to enforce state laws; local 
decisionmakers had made anti-sodomy statutes moribund.  Justice Kennedy 
wrote that: “In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for 
same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with 
respect to consenting adults acting in private.” 102   Again, that non-
enforcement would primarily be at the local prosecution level.  Justice 
Kennedy added: “The State of Texas admitted in 1994 that as of that date it 
had not prosecuted anyone under those circumstances.”103  In Texas, that 
non-enforcement would be based on decisions chiefly by elected district 
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attorneys.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor similarly 
emphasized how rarely the law had been enforced.104 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Romer v. Evans was based on the 
impact that a Colorado constitutional amendment had on disabling any local 
laws from providing anti-discrimination protection based on homosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual “orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”105  The 
Court noted that some of the largest urban centers in Colorado, such as “the 
cities of Aspen and Boulder and the city and County of Denver each 
had enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions 
and activities, including housing, employment, education, public 
accommodations, and health and welfare services.” 106   The statewide 
amendment was designed to strike down at those local anti-discrimination 
laws.  The Justices emphasized not just the general far-reaching effects of the 
statutes, but they surveyed Colorado’s state but also municipal laws.  The 
majority noted such laws “follow a consistent pattern” in enumerating 
persons or entities that may not discriminate and enumerating a range of 
groups or persons that are protected, extending beyond the Supreme Court’s 
caselaw on groups subject to strict scrutiny.107  Thus, these statutes and 
ordinances typically included an “extensive catalog of traits which cannot be 
the basis for discrimination,” including sexual orientation. 108 The Court went 
on to explain the unique disabilities imposed by the legislation, its breadth, 
and why it violated rational basis scrutiny in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.   
The Romer opinion did somewhat more than the other substantive due 
process rulings to analyze patterns in local government practices.  However, 
what is useful to highlight for these purposes is that the Justices conducted 
this brief survey of local ordinances in Colorado and the content of that local 
law mattered to the decisionmaking, while in other areas, the rarity of local 
government enforcement mattered to the ultimate decision.  In each of these 
cases, local government practices constituted important evidence used to 
support a constitutional decision.  
 
C.  Local Practices and the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 Much of the body of law that established race discrimination in the 
United States post-Reconstruction was enacted at the local level, in the form 
of ordinances regulating public accommodations, education, employment, and 
housing; they were supplemented by state laws and constitutional provisions 
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but they enacted racial preferences and segregation locally.109  Following 
Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court remanded in Brown II the 
question of developing remedies to district courts, due to their “proximity to 
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings.”110 Over time, the 
Supreme Court focused more on the unit of local government, in this case the 
school district (which might or might not correspond with municipal or 
county lines) and increasingly limited inter-district remedies.111  As a result, 
the caselaw did not account for practices as between counties or patterns 
across a state; the caselaw focused on practices within individual local 
entities.  In that way, the cases were a strong example of the fourth category 
set out in this Part, in which the courts used local remedies and needs to 
inform constitutional norm-development.   
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore, finding that there was an 
Equal Protection violation in conducting Florida recounts in the 2000 
Presidential election, did emphasize patterns across counties.  That ruling 
emphasized the inconsistencies in practices for conducting the Presidential 
vote recount from county to county, as well as among recount teams within 
single counties.112  The ruling has been strongly criticized, and the ruling 
itself makes its precedential value quite unclear.113  As a result, it is hard to 
say whether the Bush v. Gore decision sets out anything like a model for 
looking more carefully at patterns and disparities in local practices. That 
ruling, though, provides an example of category one, in which the court 
examines patterns of local law and practice.   
 
D.  State Cases that are Local 
 
One area in which local government matters, but only sub silentio, are 
cases in which localities are not examined, but instead, the state interests 
examined are in fact largely the work of local government decisionmakers.  
The Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment commandeering cases provide an 
example of this different phenomenon, where the constitutional problem is 
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characterized as about questions of state sovereignty, but where evidence 
concerning the preferences and policies of distinctly local actors could have 
played an important role had it been considered.   
Take the case of Printz v. United States, striking down provisions of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act under the Tenth Amendment as 
unconstitutionally requiring “state officers” to take action “in the 
implementation of federal law.”114  Although it was local sheriffs in Arizona 
and Montana who brought the lawsuit challenging the provisions under the 
Act, throughout the opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the Court 
referred to “state officers” being commanded to enforce by the federal statute, 
which did refer to state officers in its text.  Were those officers “the police 
officers of the 50 states,” as the majority of the Supreme Court pointed out?  
Are those chiefly “state officers”?  Of course not: very few police in any state 
report to state officials of any kind (aside from state troopers and the like); 
for the most part, police are locally governed and constituted at the city and 
county level.  Only about eight percent of non-federal law enforcement 
officers work for a state agency; the vast bulk work for local police agencies or 
sheriff’s offices.115  The Printz case was not a case of a state being required to 
“enact or administer a federal regulatory program,” but rather local 
government agencies.  The Court barely touched on the fact that this statute 
was actually requiring “state or local officers” to provide enforcement 
assistance.116  It was left to Justice John Paul Stevens in dissent to note, 
although without much development of the point, that the relevant question 
is whether Congress may “require local law enforcement officers to perform 
certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a federal gun 
control program.”117  Justice Stevens was the Justice to recognize something 
not adequately appreciated: the Tenth Amendment cases are localism cases 
in disguise as federalism cases.  If so, I would argue that evidence about local 
government practices, resources, or willingness to participate in the federal 
scheme in question should have mattered. 
Why does the Supreme Court so often label as federalism what is in 
fact localism?  One reason may be due to the complexity of the relationship 
between state and local government.  I would argue that “dual sovereignty” 
does not adequately capture the distinctions between state and local 
government and as a result, it does not adequately explain what burdens a 
federal scheme may or may not impose on local government actors.  The 
Court could make its rulings both more practically relevant and careful if it 
did attend to those complexities in an evidence-informed manner.  In some 
areas, the Court does so, as described in this Part.  The next Part turns to the 
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methodological issues raised by using local evidence in constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
III.  METHODS FOR USING LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
 
 There is a family resemblance in each of the areas discussed in Part II 
in which local-level regulation and practice has been important in 
constitutional interpretation.  In each of those areas, it is local government 
that makes critical decisions concerning the rights at stake, whether it is how 
election recounts are conducted, whether to seek the death penalty, or 
whether police officers should participate in a federal program.  This Part 
turns to questions regarding what methods should be used to assess local law 
and practice, including how to decide which are the relevant types of 
localities.  Next, this Part describes the different status of local government 
as laboratories of experimentation to develop new policies and potentially 
influence constitutional norms. Third, this Part asks how one should 
approach limiting the actions of outlier counties. Fourth, this Part asks what 
empirical data could better inform these questions and it sets out an 
empirical research agenda for further study of local-level law and practice. 
 
 A.  Analyzing or Considering Local Law and Practice 
 
Local constitutional law can provide different and perhaps better 
answers in a range of areas of constitutional interpretation.  In this Article, I 
have not set out an overarching theory of constitutional law.  I do not argue 
that local practices always deserve deference; they may in fact highlight 
greater conflict between what localities do and what the constitution 
demands.  In areas in which courts are simply examining the application of 
constitutional text or structure, there may be no need to examine local 
practice.  Nor, conversely, does it take an approach in which policy outcomes 
are crucial, to take local constitutional law seriously.  Even if projected policy 
outcomes are not part of the constitutional analysis, some deference or 
consideration of local governments as important constitutional actors could 
still play an important role.   
One reason do to so would be to permit local participation in 
developing norms and rules to inform constitutional questions.  Some 
scholars have argued, for example, that constitutional criminal procedure 
rules should reflect some deference to community values and preferences.118  
Others view local administrative rules as worthy of deference, in order to 
incentivize local administrative process, and to promote local democratic 
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engagement in decisions affecting constitutional rights.119  Critics of such 
approaches fear that “political pathologies” are known to affect local 
governance, particularly in areas like policing and criminal justice. 120  
Without taking a view on an administrative law-informed approach, for a 
political process approach, focused on whether minorities are systematically 
excluded from decisionmaking, attending to power dynamics at the local level 
may be as important or more so than attending to such dynamics at the state 
level.121  Attending to local practices does not mean deference or ratification 
of those local practices. 
Some answers to the questions posed about the use of state law would 
come out differently if the court is focused instead upon localities as the 
relevant unit of inquiry.  When counting states, there are counting disputes, 
including as described, questions about which states should be counted, how 
they should be counted, and how many states adopting a position are 
sufficient to suggest that their approach should be given weight in 
constitutional analysis.  The same and also different questions come up when 
examining counties.  The same questions arise regarding how to count local 
government, including as between larger cities and more rural counties, and 
whether focusing on population, density, or other features should matter 
depending on what question one is asking. 
New questions also arise, because while states are very different from 
each other, the Constitution does give them equal sovereignty.  Counties are 
not sovereign and their status is very different and is not equal for all 
purposes under state law.  If one turns to other local actors, such as local 
school boards, locally elected prosecutors, or Sheriff’s, still additional 
questions arise, regarding the scope of their authority and sovereignty.  Scale 
should also matter.  Richard Schragger points out that “obviously a city of 6 
million persons is different from a city of 100,000 or a town of 400.”122  For 
some questions, large urban counties may be relevant unit, such as questions 
regarding what policies might be appropriately adopted for regulation of 
municipal subway systems or video surveillance.  For other questions, like 
what policies are appropriate for police use of force, or what schools should do 
to assist disabled students, practices across a wide range of jurisdictions 
might be sensible subjects for careful evaluation. 
 
B. Local Laboratories of Experimentation  
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Scholars have begun to ask more questions about “who experiments” 
when state laboratories of experimentation consider and adopt new policy.  
The answer is often not state but rather local governments, whether it is 
climate change adaptation and resilience planning, immigration, drug 
enforcement, and oil and gas development. 123   Organizations of local 
government actors, such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, are also highly 
influential in policy-making; Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin and Joseph Frueh 
have called these translocal organizations of government actors (TOGAs).124 
One often-neglected feature of localities as constitutional actors is that 
local government is potentially more accountable to federal constitutional 
norms than states.  The sovereign immunity of states has a perverse and 
often unnoticed side effect.  It renders states less accountable to 
constitutional values (although they may still be enjoined through actions 
under Ex Parte Young against individual state officials).  But in contrast, 
municipal “pattern and practice” liability under Section 1983 to civil rights 
damages actions for their policies and practices, makes local government 
more directly and derivatively accountable for constitutional law 
violations.125  This is a point not examined in the literature.  States are 
treated as sovereign, responsible for creating and regulating local 
government, and are therefore treated as relevant for purposes of federalism 
in constitutional doctrine.   
Yet in some respects, localities are far more active as constitutional 
actors (and accountable as constitutional actors). To be sure, state 
governments are liable for injunctions if they engage in unconstitutional 
executive actions, and state legislation can be constitutionally challenged.126 
As a result of Monell pattern and practice liability, however, there are 
reasons to think that cities and counties might be better exemplars of 
experimentation with, but adherence to, constitutional norms. 
What if local government units adopt very different law and policy 
from each other?  As Richard Briffault has developed, a defining feature of 
“our localism” has been conflict between localities, including as between cities 
and suburbs, over questions including school finance and zoning.127  Should 
that conflict and the resulting diversity of approaches itself matter more on 
some questions than the diversity of approaches as between states, or the 
lack thereof?  In my view, courts should both examine local practices but be 
attentive to conflict and diversity, as with state law and practice.  In the 
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death penalty area, therefore, it is precisely that a small number of counties 
are outliers, and appear arbitrary as compared to how the death penalty is 
applied across the rest of the state, that lends support to Eighth Amendment 
arguments concerning the practice. 
Should local governments matter as laboratories of 
experimentation?128 In many ways, cities and counties are better situated to 
engage in experimentation than are states.  Municipalities are more closely 
connected with communities and they are more diverse in their governing 
arrangements.  One concern with experimentation is always that there could 
be a “race to the bottom” in which competition and outright conflict results in 
negative results.129  That race to the bottom is generally examined at the 
state level and not at the local level.  There are perhaps fewer reasons for 
that concern at the local or county level, given the greater local accountability 
in local government.   
That said, if local government engages in abuses that affect persons 
that are not part of the political process, then there are special reasons to 
intervene and not defer to their practices.  That is what the Department of 
Justices has done in the past with local policing agencies.130  That is also 
what dormant commerce clause doctrine does; although it is often viewed as 
ensuring against state protectionism, in many cases it is local government 
that is at issue, and the dormant commerce clause serves to protect against 
discrimination in favor of local business.131 
 
C. Outlier Localities 
 
Constitutional rulings often seek to identify various types of “outliers,” 
or states that adopt measures that are infrequent.  Attending to local 
practices does not mean that local preferences are necessarily deserving of 
deference.  As Justin Driver has developed, “constitutional outliers” come in 
several varieties and the Supreme Court’s practice is complex; sometimes the 
problem is that a minority of states are “holdouts” that are the last to retain a 
practice; sometimes it is a new “upstart” that breaks the prior mold; 
sometimes it is a “backup” or an effort to do something novel to evade a 
constitutional rule; and sometimes, in Driver’s valuable taxonomy, it is a 
“throwback” effort to revive a largely abandoned approach.132  Each of those 
                                                
128  Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama 
Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 267 (2011). 
129 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking “The Race to the 
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1210-11 
n.1 (1992). 
130 Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Police Reform, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. (2009). 
131 See, e.g. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (striking down municipal 
waste regulation that required waste to be processed at local transfer facility). 
132 Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014). 
LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
	 30	
types of outlier treatments is be relevant as to localities.  A locality could be a 
“holdout,” retaining a practice that the vast majority have abandoned.  A 
locality might be a “throwback” reviving a constitutionally suspect practice. 
If there is some consensus on the goal of a constitutional right, then 
there may also be consensus that some level of departure from constitutional 
norms is an outlier approach and unconstitutional.  In the substantive due 
process area, that is in effect what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence, when 
it concluded that it was vanishingly rare for any locality to enforce anti-
sodomy laws.  Indeed, some have questioned whether Lawrence should be 
seen as a ruling suppressing state outliers; as Justin Driver has argued, the 
case involved “invalidation of thirteen state law.”133  However, if the problem 
is seen as one that should be understood as not with state law on the books, 
but a practice that was in fact highly aberrational at the local level, then the 
opinion can properly be seen as an effort to enforce the constitution as 
against outlier localities.  Driver views this as a problem of “nonenforcement” 
and that non-enforcement should not necessarily render a practice an outlier, 
or as a fallback, that if it is to be considered, it would raise too many 
complications to be useful, since one could have a measure that was adopted 
in all fifty states but not enforced.134  I view the problem very differently. 
Courts must look at the right unit of government when conducting 
constitutional interpretation.  Looking merely at the law on the (state) books 
and not how it is operationalized at the relevant (local) level can entirely miss 
the constitutional problem. 
As I have described, it is not unduly complex but is in fact an accepted 
approach in a range of constitutional areas to focus on local enforcement and 
non-enforcement.  I would counter that if a measure was in fact adopted in all 
fifty states, but arbitrarily and locally enforced only in a few scattered 
localities, that it should properly be scrutinized as a potential “outlier” 
practice.  To be sure, non-enforcement alone is not necessarily enough to 
raise red flags.  As David Strauss points out, “some restrictions may be 
unenforced because they are so universally accepted that they are hardly ever 
violated, such as laws forbidding slavery or cannibalism.”135  
However, lack of enforcement, together with a trend away from the use 
of a practice, and selective or rare use of a practice, can all contribute to 
suspicion that the practice does not deserve the same deference when facing a 
constitutional challenge.136  In the death penalty area, that is what the Court 
did, without quite stating as much, in abolishing the juvenile death penalty, 
which similarly few localities had imposed in recent decades, although a 
quite a bit larger number of states retained the practice.  I have argued that 
the entire death penalty is now a phenomenon of a few outlier localities, and 
                                                
133 Id. at 990. 
134 Id. at 992. 
135 Strauss, supra note xxx, at 877. 
136 Id. at 878.	
LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
	 31	
for that reason it raises substantial arbitrariness concerns.  More research 
should be done regarding geographic variation in other areas of criminal 
punishment.  For example, there is evidence that life without parole 
sentences are highly concentrated; in Texas, the bulk of such sentences come 
from Harris County, for example.137 
This discussion suggests that the consequences of attending to local 
constitutional law is to punish outlier counties, but we should also think 
about the converse: how to reward local government that adopts successful 
practices.  Courts may reward localities that do address the policy question 
and attempt to protect constitutional norms, but suppress approaches that 
are poorly designed to do so.  One way to reward localities is through 
dismissing constitutional claims against them and citing to their rules and 
practices as an example.  That does provide some incentive to localities. 
However, a better way to reward such localities might be for state or 
federal actors to actually reward them in the form of resources and grant 
support.  The only way to even conduct such analysis is to produce adequate 
data on what local-level practices are and then evaluate them.  In few areas, 
have the courts insisted on any such thing.  However, research institutes or 
granting agencies could insist on such data and provide seed funding and 
grant support for localities that do adopt evidence-based approaches. 
One general approach towards promoting experimentation in 
constitutional law is known as democratic experimentalism, which as 
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel explain, involves setting constitutional floors 
but encouraging and empirically assessing progress above that floor.  Certain 
Supreme Court decisions that are expressed in prophylactic terms, like 
Miranda v. Arizona, can be seen as setting a constitutional floor above which 
jurisdictions are free to experiment.138  In response to the Court’s decision in 
Miranda, Dorf and Sabel note: “there has been almost no actual 
experimentation.”139  In fact, since they wrote their Article, there has been a 
great deal of experimentation, but little of it that has been in any identifiable 
way in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling Miranda, and much of it 
occurring at the local level and not at the state level.  That experience 
provides a lesson how local constitutional law can develop.  
The area of custodial interrogations has undergone a real revolution in 
the past decade. Many local governments and some entire states have 
adopted videotaping of interrogations. 140   They have done so because 
videotaping has become fairly inexpensive, but also because of a large body of 
research on what cases false confessions, together with examples of 
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exonerations involving false confessions.141   That said, constitutional law 
could have facilitated this change in local practices.  As a matter of 
constitutional law, courts could have prioritized accurate evidence from 
interrogations and encouraged local police to document and record 
interrogations to ward off false confessions.  Instead, the practical challenges 
faced by government decisionmakers and changing research and technology, 
and not constitutional law, has informed policy and practice.  Nor was the 
Miranda well suited towards providing guidance to agencies seeking to 
improve interrogation practices; the ruling did not engage with local 
government practices.  Yet, almost in spite of the Supreme Court’s Fifth 
Amendment regulation, which is highly complex, but not informative of best 
practices, there has been an enormous amount of experimentation that 
actually has improved interrogation practices.  Constitutional law has little 
influence over interrogation practice and policy—but it could if it attended to 
the right local practices. 
There are some advantages to preferring localism in constitutional law 
that does try to reward experimentation.  Local government may have 
substantial leeway in how it sets its policy, making local government far 
more able to experiment broadly in policy and in law.  As Wayne Logan 
explains, “Although the substance of local laws must comport with state and 
federal constitutional expectations, local governments typically are limited 
only to the extent that their laws are preempted by or conflict with extant 
state law.”142  Local government may be a far more capable and flexible 
laboratory for experimentation than state government. 
 
D. A Local Empirical Research Agenda 
 
One challenge in many of the areas developed in this Article is a lack 
of data concerning local law and practice.  Even on high-profile topics like the 
death penalty, scholars (like this author) had to painstakingly hand-collect 
county-level data because it did not already exist.  In some areas, including in 
criminal law and procedure, there has been an endemic lack of adequate data 
to study important questions, including constitutional questions.143  Courts 
may defer, in the name of localism, to local practices without realizing that 
they are in fact outlier practices. 
Some federal agencies conduct surveys of counties that can provide 
valuable information.  For example, the Department of Agriculture tracks 
socioeconomic indicators like poverty, unemployment, median household 
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income and education, at the county level.144  The Department of Commerce 
collects county-level economic data on employment, business patterns, and 
building permits.145  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
collects county-level data on a wide range of health issues, including alcohol 
use, births, cancer, chronic diseases, deaths and mortality, immunizations, 
obesity, physical activity, and other data. 146   In criminal justice, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
maintains data on county-level arrests and offenses in its Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program. 147  County-level data on voting patterns in federal 
elections is available and many states make election results available online, 
with voting district-level results as well. 148   The DOJ Bureau of Justice 
Statistics conducts census studies of local criminal justice actors, including 
public defender offices, publicly funded crime laboratories, local law 
enforcement agencies, and problem-solving courts.149   
Researchers are receptive to interest by the judiciary.  If courts express 
interest in taking account of patterns of local practices, then researchers will 
do more work to measure and evaluate those local practices.  That has 
occurred in the death penalty area, where two generations of academic 
researchers have conducted state-level and national studies of death 
sentencing patterns.  There will also be more pressure for localities to make 
data and practices public and available to researchers, if they are relevant to 
judicial decisionmaking.  Research grants and non-profits interested in 
funding salient academic research will similarly provide resources to conduct 
local government research if it could inform constitutional doctrine. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The local matters in constitutional interpretation.  I have described 
how local governments are commonly actors in constitutional litigation.  For 
that reason, their interests can receive some deference and they can shape 
the litigation.  When local government practices inform doctrine, however, it 
does so as a type of evidence.  I classify and discuss examples of four types of 
use of local evidence in constitutional law, in which courts: (1) examine 
patterns of local law and practice; (2) examine best practices at the local level 
to influence the appropriate constitutional floor; (3) examine county-level 
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enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely enforced 
at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional 
norm-development.   
The use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation can itself be 
far more evidence-based.  Courts can and do attend to patterns in local 
decisionmaking, but they often neglect to do so in areas in which the local 
could meaningfully inform the analysis.  In doing so, there are important 
methodological limitations and challenges.  In many areas, there is a genuine 
lack of data concerning local rules and practices.  To set a constitutional floor 
without such information can be mistaken.  However, if courts demand data, 
then there will be pressure to collect it and the resources and incentives to 
analyze it.  Whether courts then make good use of data is another question.  
The death penalty context provides a case study in how better local-level data 
can inform important questions of police and constitutional rights; whether 
these data will inform constitutional analysis remains to be seen. 
We learn important things about constitutional rights by 
disaggregating state and local interests.  Local governments are often the 
relevant decisionmakers and their incentives and structures matter to ensure 
compliance with constitutional values. However, it is not enough to preserve 
the role of local government by relying on local actors as defense litigants in 
constitutional cases.  We need to know whether the rules or practices of a 
litigant are representative before crediting them.  We can obtain a better 
sense of how constitutional rights are implemented on the ground by paying 
attention to local patterns of enforcement or practice.  Nor should we neglect, 
however, the role that state-level resources and law plays in setting practices.  
We can neglect the way in which there is a great deal of heterogeneity among 
local governments, ranging from rural counties to urban cities.   Improved 
data collection should attend to all of those questions. 
The local matters in constitutional law, but it does not consistently 
matter, and local governments sometimes receive deference without good 
evidence of the state of local law and practice.  Local evidence can be used, 
not just to defer to localities, but to reach better results in constitutional law.  
Local evidence can be used more accurately and effectively.  Judges, lawyers, 
and researchers should take more account of evidence from the local, even 
when interpreting the Constitution.  In making local constitutional law more 
evidence-informed, judges can avoid the selective use of the local in 
constitutional law.  That alone would be an enormous improvement in the 
use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation. 
